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In the body of traditional economics the role of the utility concept has been ambiguous. 
On the one hand it is central in micro –economic model building to explain human choice 
behavior. On the other hand it is shunned, since it appeared very hard to give it an 
empirical content. With respect to the explanation of choice behavior this could be 
overcome by introducing the concept of ordinal utility. However, if we are interested in 
inequality, the concept of ordinal utility becomes useless, for the cornerstone of the 
inequality concept is the assumption that the situation of individuals can be compared, 
not only in terms of better and worse, but also in terms of how much better or worse. If 
we want to compare individual well-being between individuals, it requires a cardinal well 
–being
1  concept. 
Notwithstanding this, the inequality concept has already a long history in economics. 
Things started with measuring income inequalities. These were statistical parameters that 
described the distribution of observed incomes. Well- known examples are the Pareto α, 
the standard deviation of log – incomes or Theil’s entropy measure. In terms of such 
measures perfect equality corresponds with a value zero.  
Atkinson (1970) was one of the first who devised an inequality measure that was more 
than a statistical measure. Although he never stated this explicitly, he proposed in fact 
that the relevant measure to gauge social inequality is not the inequality of incomes but 
the inequality of individual well –being. This inequality measure was based on a social 
welfare function (SWF) where minimum inequality corresponds with the situation where 
the social welfare function is maximized and due to concavity everybody enjoys an equal 
amount of utility or well -being. Atkinson suggested that this measure did not involve a 
cardinal utility concept, but this is debatable. Taking averages over utility implies a 
                                                 
1 In line with the modern happiness economics literature we use the terms utility, welfare, well-being and 
satisfaction as standing for the same empirical concept. Although from a philosophical and semantic point 
of view we may differentiate between the concepts, in practice this appears impossible. Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
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cardinality concept. The weakness of the approach was that there was no empirical 
foundation for the specification of  the  underlying utility function of income.  
At about the same time the present author (1971) argued that by means of a subjective 
questioning technique one could define and estimate a cardinal welfare function of 
income, which later on became a key concept of the Leiden School and which can be 
seen as a forerunner of modern happiness economics estimation methods. By combining 
empirically estimated well –being with theoretical inequality indexes, the theoretical 
inequality concept could be empirically filled. A first example was how Atkinson’s index 
was empirically implemented in Van Praag (1977) (see also Van Praag and Ferrer-i-
Carbonell (2004, ch. 13)).  
Apart from the cardinality issue there is a potential second problem with well-being 
inequality measures in general. income inequality measures are explicitly or implicitly 
based on a transferable utility concept. Indeed, income can be redistributed. There are 
however more well-being determinants than income (e.g. health, age, education, and IQ). 
Most of these determinants cannot be redistributed but they are relevant for well -being, 
and inter-individual differences in those non-income determinants may cause feelings of 
well –being inequality as well. It follows that well-being inequality cannot be a simple 
generalization of income inequality, as feelings of inequality in well –being may be 
caused by many factors, only one of which is income. We do not have a simple ideal 
benchmark of what is minimal inequality either. Theoretically, this has to be equality of  
individual well –being, but this concept is empty, as long as we do not accept an 
empirical individual well –being concept . 
Nowadays the results of happiness economics have led to a beginning acceptance of the 
possibility to estimate subjective well–being directly by means of evaluation questions of 
the type: 
 how do you evaluate your life as a whole  on a scale from 0 to 10, where zero stands for 
the worst and 10 for the best situation.?  
We refer to Frey and Stutzer (2002), Layard (2005), Van  Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell 
(2003, 2004, 2008), Clark, Frijters, and Shields (2008), Dolan et al. (2008), Graham 
(2008) for surveys of the blooming literature. Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
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In this paper we shall argue that the present model used in happiness literature is 
essentially incomplete. The present literature
2 is in essence about empirically estimating 
the equation  () UU x  , where x  stands for a vector of characteristics of the individual x. 
In relatively few contributions the impact of the reference group of the individual is 
recognized. This is done by including the average income  ref x  of the reference group and 
positing and estimating the extended model  (, ) ref UU x x  . However, if we look at 
inequality this model is insufficient. Inequality summarizes the inter-individual 
comparison process, where both the question of how much importance the individual 
assigns to comparisons with others and the variation between individuals within the 
reference group plays an important role as well. 
In Section 2 we shall discuss the operational concept of subjective well–being. In Section 
3 we shall develop the corresponding well–being inequality concept. In section 4 we shall 
take account of the fact that no individual evaluates in isolation, but that the 
circumstances of his reference group co–determine his norms on what is subjective well–
being. It follows that the phenomenon of social transparency or lack of transparency 
plays a role in the evaluation of social subjective well–being. This calls for developing a 
model of the referencing process and the definition of a personal subjective inequality 
concept, which describes the inequality the individual perceives between his satisfaction 
level and the satisfaction levels of others in his reference group. In Section 5 we 
aggregate those feelings of personal inequality into a social subjective inequality concept.  
The aim of this paper is to sketch a theoretical model of how the reference mechanism 
affects individual well–being and, consequently, the well –being inequality concept. 
Finally, we consider how these insights may contribute to the shaping of social policy. In 
this paper we do not give an empirical application. The reason for this is that we do not 
know of the existence of a data set that would make it possible to estimate the model. In 
Section 6 we discuss how these concepts might  be made operational in practice.  
In Section 7 we shall briefly consider the implications for social policy, while Section 8 
concludes. 
                                                 
2 In section 2 we shall look more in detail on the present literature.  Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
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This paper may also be read as a plea for creating more empirical information on the 
referencing process by extracting information from individuals in surveys and 
experimental settings.  
We hope that the model outlined in this paper may be a fruitful starting point for 
integrating the referencing mechanism in happiness economics. This is the final objective 
of this paper. 
 
 
2. Subjective well–being. 
 
The concept of subjective well–being is empirically based on the so-called satisfaction 
questions like the one cited in the introduction. Such satisfaction questions can also be 
posed with respect to life domains, such as health, financial situation and job situation, 
yielding empirical evaluations of domain satisfaction or domain well –being. The 
answers to such questions are mainly categorized on a numerical scale from 0 to 10, 1 to 
10, or 1 to 7. There is now a growing consensus that such answers have cardinal 
significance (cf. Easterlin (2006)). Respondents have a conception of a worst and a best 
situation and they situate their situation between those points. At the moment nearly all 
empirically used question modules are categorized, such that only the points 0, 1, 2,…, 
and 10 are possible answers, but it does not need much fantasy to assume that in the near 
future those answers will be asked and given on a continuous scale by the respondent 
who positions himself on a continuous  line segment where the left end – point stands for 
the evaluation of the worst conceivable situation and the right end – point for the best 
conceivable situation. Let the situation itself be described by some characteristics like 
‘income’, ‘health status’  , ‘ age ‘, in short a vector x, then the evaluation of x is described 
by a number  () Ux. We will call such a function a satisfaction function
3 . 
The most simple approach is now to denote the responses on the satisfaction question by 
U, which can assume values 0, 1, 2,…, and 10, and to postulate an explanatory model like 
                                                 
3 We avoid the term utility, since in all empirical questions the word ‘satisfied’ is used.  Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
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  01 2 3 .. . nn n n n U income age familysize          (2.1) 
 
where the variable  income stands either for household income of for its logarithm. The 
other variables are also defined either by absolute values or by their logarithms. This 
specification or similar ones yield very interesting and stable results (see e.g. 
Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004). 
The problem with this specification is that the RHS can assume values outside the range 
[0,10]. An easy transformation avoids this logical problem. 
We may describe  ( ) Ux by a tractable distribution function on ( , )  with the range 
[0,1]. This suggests the normal or the logistic as obvious choices. We assume  
 
  01 2 3 (. . . ; 0 , 1 ) nn n n U N income age familysize        (2.2) 
 
where (.;0,1) N  stands for the standard normal   distribution function. 
Denoting the inverse by 
1() nn uN U
   and adding an error term we get the OLS model  
 
  01 2 3 .. . nn n n n u income age familysize            (2.3) 
  
It has been empirically found (see e.g. Van Praag, Ferrer-i-Carbonell 2004, and also 
Ferrer-i-Carbonell, Frijters (2004) for related results ) that the estimated trade–off ratios 
/ ij     for both specifications are nearly always not statistically different from each 
other. Actually, this is not that strange as both formulations are describing the same 
indifference curves on the (income, age, familysize) – space. They are just two different 
cardinalizations of the same preference ordering.  
These satisfaction functions are subjective and individualized. They are subjective, 
because they are derived from gauging subjective feelings. They are individualized 
because individual variables determine life satisfaction. Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
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3. Subjective inequality 
 
Up to now there are only a few attempts to define inequality with respect to happiness or 
subjective well –being
4 (SWB) (Ferrer-i-Carbonell,  Van Praag (2003), Van Praag, Ferrer 
-i-Carbonell ( 2004 and 2008)). Nevertheless, the same need for income inequality 
definitions that has produced such a flourishing literature in economics is now even more 
strongly felt with respect to the concept of happiness or satisfaction inequality. If we are 
looking for a definition of subjective inequality it should be based on these measured 
subjective satisfaction functions ( ) Ux.  
Here, the basic ingredient is the observed response U  and one of the corresponding 
happiness equations (2.1), (2,2) and (2.3). If all individuals in our sample would enjoy the 
same SWB - level U, it would imply that SWB –inequality is minimal. This situation may 
occur even if the SWB –determinants income, age and family size are different between 
individuals. The only thing that counts is that their corresponding U – values according to 
(2.3) are identical. The individuals have to be on the same indifference curve. The 
advantage of this definition on the basis of subjective, individually specified, satisfaction 
functions is that satisfaction or well –being is not only determined by income but by 
many other determinants as well, such as age, number of children, and health. For 
instance, there is strong evidence that the age and health of the individual are 
determinants of life satisfaction. It follows then that part of the observed inequality in 
well-being may be explained by differences in age and health. If individuals have the 
same U (or u) –value, they enjoy the same level of subjective well -being. Moreover, the 
individualization implies that different individuals may evaluate the same objective 
situation (e.g. characterized by income) differently, depending on personal characteristics 
such as age and health. 
                                                 
4 Notice that happiness inequality is something else as the effect of  income inequality on individual well –
being. We refer to Graham and Felton (2006) for an interesting study on this latter relation for Latin –
American countries. Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
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Now we may define inequality with respect to SWB in a similar manner as it has been 
defined with respect to income. That is any income inequality index  1 ( ,..., ) N I yy  has his 
SWB – analogue  1 ( ,..., ) N I uu , The u-   variable takes over the role of (log-)income. 
Surely, definition of a SWB- inequality index implies accepting the cardinal significance 
of  U , as the measurement of inequality implies giving a meaning to the difference 
between various levels of SWB. Consequently, if we do not believe in a cardinal 
significance of the responses to satisfaction or happiness questions, then it is impossible 
to define an SWB – inequality index, irrespective of the specific definition of that 
inequality index  1 ( ,..., ) N I uu . This is true, notwithstanding the fact that under an ordinal 
interpretation complete equality may be identified  as the situation, where  all individuals 
assign an  equal satisfaction value U to their situation. 
In this paper we choose for a rather simple and intuitive definition of SWB- inequality. 
We specify inequality by the variance (or standard deviation) of u over the sample or 
population. As already said, we may also use any other usual income inequality measure 
like the Gini –index, the Theil -index, Pareto -or the Atkinson – index. However, in this 
context, where we aim at introducing the reference group effect within an inequality 
context, we take the inequality definition which is most convenient for the exposition. 
Let us assume (2.3), that is  
 
  01 2 3 .. . nn n n n u income age familysize            (3.1) 
 








   (3.2) 
 
where we ignore the random error. The nice consequence of the existence of a 
relationship like (3.2) is that we may trace the effects of changes in personal 
characteristics  1 ( ,..., ) nn k n x xx  on overall well- being. Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
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The first approach according to which we might define subjective well–being inequality 
with respect to a specific population is  
 
 
2()    xx u      (3.3) 
 
Here the variance is taken with respect to the population density  ( ) f x  of the vector of 
relevant characteristics x, and  xx   is the population covariance matrix of the vector x  of 
welfare determinants. The log-income variance is one of its diagonal elements. If SWB is 
only dependent on log – income, it is obvious that SWB –inequality is just 
22 (log( )) y  . 
If we assume the implicit classical assumption that SWB equals log - income, then β = 1, 
and we end up with the traditional variance of log – incomes. 
We see here two points to be noticed. First, the vector β makes the variance subjective. 
The vector β is assessed on the basis of subjective questions on how satisfied individuals 
are. Differences with respect to variables that correspond to a relatively large β and 
consequently have a sizeable impact on individual well –being will have a strong 
influence on overall variance, while variables with a relatively small β will have a small 
effect on overall variance as well. If income is included as one of the variables x, then 
income inequality is one of the components of SWB –inequality, but inequality in other 
variables have influence on u or well–being U as well. Second, we see that (3.3) depends 
on the population covariance matrix  xx  . Hence, 
2() u  may be seen as an aggregate of 
population inequalities with respect to the various component variables xi, corrected for 
possible correlations between them. It is also possible to assess the effect of changes in 
the  x–distribution.  For instance, if  1 x     stands for log–income, then a change in the 
variance of log–income  11   or its covariance  12   with another variable  2 x  will 
immediately change the overall inequality index. This index may be seen as a tool for 
making government policy. In the hypothetical case that there is no objective inequality Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
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with respect to the relevant determinants x, that is xx   O, subjective inequality will be 
zero as well. 
If the inequality index is a political tool, then we may ask which variables x  are 
considered as being relevant by the government. For instance, is the number of children 
relevant for making government policy? If we should not think so, we have to ignore the 
SWB – differences due to the children effect, although it is intuitively obvious that family 
size inequality affects life satisfaction inequality. It means that we have to re-estimate 
equation (3.6) without including the variable family size. If that variable is correlated with 
other explanatory variables, as it most probably is, it will imply that the estimate of the 
vector β will change as well. This shows that the choice of explanatory variables is rather 
relevant for the definition and the measurement of subjective inequality, and this makes 
the choice of which variables are considered to be relevant for including in the inequality 
definition a political matter as such. 
 
 
4. Personal subjective inequality as felt by individuals within reference groups.  
 
The inequality index just considered does not take into account the reference 
phenomenon.  Does this index account properly for the impact of the refereeing process 
on the feelings of inequality of individual citizens? Probably it does not. The reason is 
that the evaluation by individuals of their own situation is partly done by comparing their 
own situation with that of others, the so-called reference group.  
It has been found by several authors (Van Praag (1976), Kapteyn, Van Praag,  Van 
Herwaarden, (1978), Van Praag, Kapteyn, Van Herwaarden (1979),  Hagenaars and Van 
Praag (1985), Ferrer -i-Carbonell (2005), Luttmer (2005), Stutzer (2004), Senik 
(2004,2007)) that satisfaction with life or with one’s financial situation depends not only 
on own income  n y  but on the average income of the reference group of n, say  , nr e f y , as 
well. For instance, (3.1) carries over into  
 Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
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  01 2 3 , .. . . nn n n n r e f n u income age familysize y            (4.1) 
 
The effect of own income is positive. The age effect is regularly found to be parabolic, 
first decreasing and after about 40 increasing (see. e.g. Blanchflower and Oswald, 2004, 
Plug and Van Praag (1995); Wunder et al. (2009) even distinguish a cubic age curve). For 
reasons of exposition we ignore the squared term. The effect of children on life 
satisfaction is ambiguous. The effect of reference income is mainly estimated to be 
negative, that is, own satisfaction reduces if neighbors get more, although some authors 
like Senik (2004) found a positive effect, e.g., for ex-Soviet citizens.  
Actually, the problem is how to describe the reference group. Mostly this is intuitively 
defined by assumption. The reference group is equated to persons belonging to the same 
age bracket, education group, region, etc. However, this a priori definition discards the 
possibility that we can learn from the data what the composition of the reference group 
really is.  
In order to get a more detailed description of the reference group and its influence we 
need to look more in detail. We shall outline the idea by a simple example. The group 
consists of various reference individuals with whom the individual in question, called 
Peter, compares himself. Say, Peter’s reference group consists of John and Adam. Now 
we assume that Peter is not always busy with comparing his situation to that of others. 
Sometimes he is self –oriented and sometimes other -oriented. Let us assume he self-
oreinted for 60% of his time. For 30% of the remaining time he is oriented on John and 
for 10 % on Adam. Obviously John is the more important reference person for him. Let 
us now assume that the incomes of the three persons are ordered as  J y > P A y y   . Then it 
seems reasonable to assume that the individual feels less happy if he has John in mind, 
than when he has Adam in mind, while his situation is in the middle when he is self-
orienting.  Actually, it is only one step to assume that  , nr e f y  is a random variable itself 
and that consequently perceived well –being  n u  is random as well. Well- being varies 
with the reference person or social type we happen to have in mind to compare with. 
Equation (4.1) is just the expectation of u  over the reference group. Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
An Agenda for New Research 




For convenience, let us assume that the only relevant reference characteristic is income 
and that income is measured bracket-wise. The bracket averages are ,1 , ,..., ref ref k y y . The 
individual compares sometimes with people in the first bracket, say a fraction  1,n p  of the 
time, sometimes with people in the second bracket, say a fraction  2,n p  of the time, and so 
on. Those individuals may be seen as representing social types  1,,,k   .  
 
Then we may write (4.1) more explicitly as   
 
  01 2 3 1 , , 1 , , . . . [ ... ] nn n n n r e f k n r e f k n u income age familysize p y p y             (4.2) 
 
Here each income bracket   is weighted by the importance it has in the reference group 
of individual n.  The weights, which add up to one, are denoted by 1, , ,..., nk n p p . The 
corresponding distribution we may call the reference distribution. It may be that every 
individual has the same reference group weights 1, , ,..., nk n p p  but it is more probable that 
different individuals will have different reference distributions. If all reference 
distributions are the same, the weights  1, , ,..., nk n p p  would probably reflect the objective 
population fractions  1,..., k p p  of the different income brackets. If not, the fractions   
, / in i p p  may be larger or smaller than one. If  , / in i p p >1 it follows for n that he 
overweighs the importance of people in bracket i, while   , / in i p p <1 implies the opposite. 
This ratio  , / in i p p  was termed in earlier work (see Van Praag and Ferrer-i-Carbonell, 
2004 ch.8 and earlier in Van Praag (1981)) the social filter, through which individual n 
perceives the society around him. 
We may generalize this idea to a continuous reference group where the referencing 
characteristic ref Y may take any value on the real axis. Then the reference distribution is 
described by a density function  , () ref n f y  and the average reference income to be included Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
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in (4.2) would become  , .( ) ref ref n Yy f y d y  . It is obvious now that apart from comparing 
our own income with reference income we may also compare our age to reference age, 
and our family size to reference family size. If those variables are determinants for 
happiness, it may be surmised that the same variables of the reference persons may have 
an impact on our happiness as well. The same holds for other variables held to be 
relevant. In short, the reference variable may be more –dimensional vector. Then it 
follows that we may define a random reference vector  ( , , ) ref ref ref ref X YA g eF a m s  with a 
corresponding more - dimensional reference density function , () ref n f x  and an average 
vector  ref X . Similarly we may define a variance covariance – matrix with respect to the 
reference distribution, denoted by  ref   
 
Let us now generalize (4.1) in this vein. We start simply by assuming a two – person 
world where an individual, say Peter,  has one reference person, let us call him John, to 
compare with. Peter’s situation is described by the vector  P X , and John’s situation by 
J X .  
Even in this very simple two- person world Peter may have a perception of inequality of 
SWB, when he compares his situation with that of John. As already said, an individual is 
not comparing all the time. More precisely, if an individual is never comparing with his 
neighbor, he will not perceive inequality at all. If he compares at times, then his well –
being is determined by an absolute component  P X  and by a relative component ( P X -
J X ), the difference between Peter’s and John’s situation. We assume that people 
compare their situation with others only for a fraction (1-π) of their time while for a 
fraction π  they look only at their own situation without comparing. We call the fraction π 
the self- orientation coefficient of the individual. Its complement (1-π) may be termed the 
outwards - orientation coefficient. It follows that we assume that satisfaction uP  is not 
constant for an individual but that it depends on his or her mood of the moment ,whether Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
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he or she is comparing or non –comparing his situation with that of others. In short, we 





              with chance 










   
 (4.3) 
 
Life satisfaction, even during a relatively short period, is not constant but it is random, 
depending on whom one is comparing to at the moment. We might call it instantaneous 
satisfaction. The corresponding cardinal value on [0,1] is found by means of (2.2). 
 
In the first situation in (4.3) Peter looks only at his own situation, he is self-oriented. In 
the second situation it is only the difference between him and John that counts. Notice 
that in this simple specification even if Peter and John are in the same situation, this does 
not imply that the individual ‘s  P u  is the same in both situations. Just the fact that both 
are felt to be in the same situation as such may make Peter feel less happy or more happy. 
It is evident that this specification is just an example. 
We notice that the expectation  ( ) P Eu  , like in (4.2), is a linear function in P X  and  J X   
 
  00 () . ( 1 ) . ( 1 ) ( ) P PP J Eu X X X              (4.4)   
 
If the true model is (4.4), where  , nr e f y  is a random variable depending on whether we 
compare or not at the moment, we are in fact estimating its expectation (4.1).  
We notice that the parameter π is unknown and has to be estimated as well. We cannot 
empirically identify β without further information with respect to the comparison chance. 
Perhaps, the Day Reconstruction Method, as described by Kahneman et al. (2004), can 
shed light on what is the frequency of comparison moments. 
Now we may also define a feeling of personal well –being inequality as felt by Peter. It is 
  Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
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( ) [ ( )] (1 )[ ( ) ( )]
(1 )[ ( )]
PP P P J P
PP J
u X Eu X X Eu
XX X
     
    
     
    
 (4.5) 
 
We see that the feeling of inequality is zero, if the self - orientation π is either zero or 
one. The feeling of inequality is the highest , if Peter is self –oriented half of the time, 
that is  1
2   . It is also evident that Peter and John may have a different perception of 
the inequality between them as their ’  s may be unequal and/or their satisfaction 
functions may differ. 
A generalization of this definition using other specifications of the satisfaction index  P u  
than in (4.3) lies at hand. 
 
Let us now extend the concept of a reference group from a one – person group to a multi- 
person group. Each social type is characterized by a vector X. Now instantaneous 






. . .       with chance 
()













      





The vector  , ref n X  is random and drawn from n’s  reference distribution with density 
function  , () ref n f x . We have here a random choice process in two stages. The first choice 
determines whether the individual is in a comparing or a non-comparing mood, chances 
being (1-π )  and π , respectively. Second, the question is which specific reference type 
, ref n X  is coming into n’s mind, when he is actually comparing. This is described by the Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
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reference density function , () ref n f x . Since more persons may be described by the same 
vector  , ref n x , it is the description of a social type. The random vector  , ref n X  is varying 
over the space of social types. Notice that the expectation of  n u  is  
 
 
00 , () . [ ]( 1 ) [ ( ) ] nn n n r e f n Eu X X X            
 (4.7) 
 
where , ref n X is the vector of expectations of , ref n X with respect to the reference density 
function  , () ref n f x . One may call the average vector , ref n X  the social focal point of n. 
Notice that it is by no means necessary that , ref n n X X  , that is , that individuals take their 
own type as the focal point of their reference group. More usually they may take 
somebody or some social type, who is socially above them, as a social focal point. 
Equation (4.7) or rather the  expectation of (4.6) with respect to  , ref n X is estimated in the 
happiness literature. It is linear in own characteristics and in the average characteristics 
, ref n X  of the reference group. Up to now in the empirical literature reference groups are 
defined in terms of income only. This implies that all elements of the parameter vector γ 
are assumed to be zero, except the element  y  , which refers to income.  There is however 
nothing against it to characterize reference persons by a more-dimensional vector of 
characteristics instead of one-dimensionally by income only. 
 
 
In accordance with the definition in (4.5) in the case of a multi-person reference group we 
now define the feeling of  personal subjective inequality from the viewpoint of individual 
n as  
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00 , , () ( 1 ) [ ( ) ] ( 1 ) .   nn n r e f n r e f n uX X X                   
 (4.8) 
 
This formula is based on the well – known variance decomposition formula. There are 
now two ‘subgroups’ distinguished. The first is the one – person group consisting of the 
individual n himself, while the second subgroup is his or her reference group, consisting 
of many different social types. Hence, there is a ‘between’ – inequality described by the 
first term in (4.8) and a ‘within’ – inequality of the reference group itself, given by the 
second term. 
Personal subjective inequality appears to depend on four elements. First, it depends on 
the self-orientation coefficient  π; second, it depends on the perceived difference between 
the individual and his or her reference group; third, on the vector γ, that is, on the effects  
γ of the reference vector elements on satisfaction. Some components have strong 
influence like reference income, while others presumably will have negligible influence; 
fourth, it depends on the spread within the reference group, that is, the covariance 
matrix , ref n  . It describes in a sense the individual’s horizon of society as perceived by 
individual n. If one diagonal element, say corresponding to reference income, is larger 
than another, say, with respect to reference age, it means that the reference group of n is 
wider with respect to income than with respect to age.  
We may interpret the off- diagonal elements, say , ref ij  , in a similar way. If the covariance 
(or the correlation) is strongly positive it implies a strong positive correlation within the 
reference group between, for example, income and age. A negative correlation may be 
interpreted likewise. 
It is obvious that the reference covariance matrix  , ref n   is related to but not necessarily 
identical with that of the objective population distribution. More specifically, if the 
underlying population is perfectly homogeneous with respect to a characteristic Xi 
( , ref i X is constant) and hence the corresponding population variance 0 ii   , the reference 
group mostly will be perceived as perfectly homogeneous as well with respect to that Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
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characteristic  Xi, that is,  , 0 ref ii    as well. It follows then that the corresponding 
population and reference covariances are zero as well. 
We notice that all parameters seem to be estimable, when we are able to get more specific 
observations on the individual reference process. We need answers to the question how 
frequently an individual compares his own situation with that of others , yielding a   -
estimate and we need to know with whom the individual compares to get an idea of the 
reference density function , () ref n f x .  That is, we need per individual n with characteristics 
n X  a sample  ,, 1 {}
M
ref n m m X   of order M in order to estimate n’s reference distribution. 
 
 
5. Social Subjective inequality with a referencing mechanism. 
 
Now as policy makers we are not so much interested in the inequality feelings of one 
person, as specified in by (4.8) by 
2() n u  ,but rather in the average feeling of social 
inequality in society at large, that is 
2 [( ) ] nn E u  , where the average is taken with respect 
to all members  n of the population. 
Now we have to account for the fact that each person may have his or her own reference 
group. For each person n we define again the vector of satisfaction 
determinants , (, ) nr e f n XX . Its dimension is 2k. We call the first half the objective 
determinants. They describe the situation of person n. The second half of the vector 
stands for characteristics of reference persons of n.  They are called the reference values. 
We can ask the person n at a specific moment in time with whom or what social type he 
is comparing himself. The answer is , ref n X . The first vector is pretty fixed per person, but 
, ref n X  may vary per moment. It is random. Its distribution is the reference distribution of 
n. 
If we consider the whole population, then  , (, ) nr e f n XX  may be considered as a random 
vector defined on the whole population with an expectation (, ) ref XX  and a (2k x 2k) - 
covariance matrix Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
An Agenda for New Research 





       










Now it is tempting to assume the distribution to be normal, which may be realized after 
suitable redefinition of the variables. For example, taking logs frequently helps a good 
deal. Still better is to apply an integral transformation where quantiles of the empirical 
distribution function are mapped on the corresponding quantiles of the standard normal 
distribution function. Again, we observe that choosing for normality after suitable 
transformation of the observations does not imply that the model cannot be generalized to 
non-normal distributions. However, for the sake of exposition we assume normality. In 
fact, whether a normal specification is realistic, has to be inferred from empirical 
observation. 
Now it appears possible and appropriate to assume that different individuals have 
different reference groups, and, consequently, that they have different reference 
distributions.  We see that the individual reference distributions, introduced before, may 
be interpreted as conditional distributions of ref X , given the objective determinants X of  
n. A very pleasant property of normal distributions is that the conditional distributions 
have different means ,but the same constant covariance matrix. 
The conditional averages of those individual reference distributions will vary with the 




,, () ( )
ref ref ref r e fn r e fn n n r e f x x x x n X EX X x X x X
        (5.2) 
 
As before, we call this conditional average the social focal point of n. The focal point 
varies with the objective characteristics n x  . Mostly we may assume a positive correlation 
between objective individual characteristics  n x  and reference characteristics, as 
individuals tend to compare themselves with those who belong to the same social group. Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
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ref xx  =O, the gravity point of the reference distribution is constant. In a similar way 
using the well–known formulae of normal distribution theory we find that the covariance 




ref ref ref ref r e fn r e fn n x x x x x x x x n VX X x
       (5.3) 
 
 
This conditional covariance matrix is the same matrix  , ref n   which we used in (4.8). It is 
obviously smaller  (in the sense of matrix ordering) than the overall reference covariance 
matrix 
ref ref xx  . Under the assumption of normality this matrix is constant, that is , 
, ref n  = ref  . 
 





ref ref ref nr e f n nr e f x x x x n
n
X XX X X X
CI B X




where C  is a constant vector and B  is the matrix of ‘regression’ coefficients of  , ref n X  on 
n X .  
Now we may define overall social inequality as the expectation of (4.8) over the 
population. 
Using (5.4) we rewrite  
 
00 , 00 () ( ( ) ) nn r e f n n
n
X XX C I B X
CD X
             
   
 
 
where   00 C     C    is a scalar and where (( ) ) I B       =D   is a row vector. 
It follows then that  
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         
     




. If  =1, that is no comparison with other individuals, the inequality is zero. In the case 
that the individual derives his satisfaction completely by comparison ( =  0) the 
inequality will be       xx     .  
 
It follows that subjective inequality does not only depend on the inequality with respect 
to own welfare determinants, but that it also depends on the individual reference effects 
and on the inequality in the reference group.  
In the above we made the convenient assumption that the underlying distribution of 
, (, ) nr e f n XX  would be multivariate normal. Although not unreasonable as a first 
approximation, it is not really needed. The conceptual model just described holds for any 




6. Where to find the data? 
 
Unfortunately the model is not yet operational by lack of data. The problem is obviously 
how to estimate the matrices ,
ref ref ref xxx x  and the comparison chance  . This is only 
possible if we can observe per individual the whole vector  , (, ) nr e f n XX  and not only the 
first half of that vector. This implies repeated interviewing in order to get an idea per 
individual of his/her reference distribution   and to get an estimate of the self-orientation Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
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parameter   , that is how frequently he compares with other people. A relatively rare 
example of frequent interviewing is the diary method, as applied by Kahneman et al. 
(2004), which they call the Day Reconstruction Method. 
A first inspiration content-wise is given by a recent paper by Clark and Senik (2008) who 
analyzed two questions put in Wave 3 of the European Social Survey (ESS). One 
question is the following: “Whose income would you be most likely to compare your own 
with? Please choose one of the groups on this card: Work colleagues/ Family members/ 
Friends/ Others/Don’t compare/ Not applicable/ Don’t know.” This question, which was 
very well responded to, is in the spirit of the questions we would have in mind. 
We would suggest for comparisons to construct a  , ref n X - vector some nuclear questions 
like these: 
 
Everybody compares his situation with that of others. When you compare yourself other 
persons, take the person (perhaps plural? To make the respondent think about a group of 
people) in mind with whom you most frequently compare. Call him John / Betsy. Please, 
can you describe some features of Betsy 
1.  What might be Betsy’s net household income about? 
2.  How would you classify Betsy ‘s health on a scale from 0 to 10? 
3.  How old is Betsy ? 
4.  What is her family size ? 
5.  Her age ?  
6.  Her employment status ? 
7.  Her education ? 
8.  Would you classify her in the first place as Work colleague/ Family member/ 
Friend/ Others / Not applicable/ Don’t know 
9.  How often do you see Betsy ? 
10. Do you think that Betsy is happier , equally happy, or less happy in life than you ? 
11. Would you be happier , equally happy, or less happy in life when you were Betsy 
than you are feeling now being yourself? Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
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It is obvious that this is just a first suggestion on possible questions, but it is clear 
repeated interviews would give the researcher an idea about who are the reference 
persons of each individual and, concretely, about the distribution of , ref n X . As there is 
frequently more than one reference person, we could try to ask the same question for a 
second person, say Peter. Moreover, we could try to get an idea of how frequently the 
respondent compares with Betsy and how frequently with Peter. Obviously this can be 
extended to more reference persons. It is in this way that we think that the reference 
group model outlined above may be operationalized. 
 
 
7. What does this mean for social policy? 
 
  Let us assume a government which is interested in enhancing the well – being of its 
people.  It formulates a Social Welfare Function (SWF) analogous to Markowitz’ 
portfolio theory, as  
 
2 SWF    . ( ) (1 ). ( )     Eu u      (7.1) 
 
It is a   - weighted average of average individual SWB and inequality in individual 
SWB, where social inequality is negatively signed, assumed to be bad. The SWF has to 
be maximized and the question is now what instruments the government can use. 
Obviously, there are some objective characteristics X like e.g. income, education, and 
health which may be influenced by government, although not without a cost attached.  A 
change in the parameters β will be rather difficult as they describe real preferences. The 
same holds more or less for the parameters γ. They stand for the jealousy effects, which 
seem to be fixed elements of human nature and although we do not deny that ethical 
/religious indoctrination may reduce jealousy effects, we do not think that this is a very 
powerful policy nowadays. Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
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However, a final element is the matrix
ref ref xx  . It describes the transparency of society, 
and there holds the larger the transparency, the greater personal inequality feelings will 
be. 




0 SWF   .(( ( ) (1 )( )) (1 ).( ( ) xr e f X Xu                (7.2) 
 
The second term may be written more explicitly by substituting (5.5). From this formula 
(7.2) it is clear that the parameters of the referencing mechanism play an important role in 
the perception of the SWF. As we saw already, the reference distribution is a description 
of how visible other people are for a citizen.  The covariance matrix describes the social 
transparency of society with respect to a number of relevant dimensions, described by the 
dimensions of X.  
It is obvious that the referencing process is a sociological phenomenon, which can be 
influenced. We think here especially of media policy. For instance, when television 
disseminates on a day to day basis how the rich are living it is obvious that the frequency 
of comparing and social transparency is increased enormously. In formula it would imply 
that 
ref ref x x   is increased while    and  
ref xx  are decreased, as social segmentation is 
reduced.  
The same holds on a global level for global inequality feelings. Hence, governments, and 
to a lesser extent publications in radio and printed journals and newspapers, have a non–
negligible and perhaps even enormous effect on the referencing mechanism. Although it 
is fashionable to welcome more social transparency, it is a matter to be discussed whether 
this tendency is good from a standpoint of social well-being. The model outlined above 
suggests that there are risks involved. 
 
 
There will be costs associated with the manipulation of  , ref  , ,
ref ref ref xxx x   . These costs 
may be purely monetary but they may also be of a non – monetary nature. For instance, a Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
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reduction of social transparency will be considered by some as a loss, especially by the 
press. If we try to maximize the SWF we may add a social cost –function of the type. 
(, , )





        0
ref ref




















In this paper we built a model to include the social referencing mechanism into happiness 
economics. We do not have the illusion that this model will be estimable in a year from 
now. However, as section 6 suggests, it is certainly conceivable to estimate the missing 
parameters of the reference mechanism by posing suitable questions. 
It is well- known that comparing with reference groups affects feelings of individual 
subjective well –being. In this paper we argue that referencing affects inequality feelings 
as well. The subjective inequality concept was introduced in Van Praag, Ferrer -i- 
Carbonell (2008). When we are investigating inequality of subjective well–being we have 
to recognize that interpersonal comparisons by individuals with their reference persons 
must be at the basis of the inequality concept. Therefore we defined an individual’s 
reference group as a distribution of reference persons described in terms of the same 
characteristics which we deem to be relevant satisfaction determinants for the individual 
himself. 
If we assume that the individual’s well-being is partly determined by comparison with his 
reference group, the same will hold for his perception of the inequality of well being; in Well-being Inequality and Reference Groups  
An Agenda for New Research 
Version March 3, 2010 
 
27
fact, it is the well –being inequality within his reference group plus  the inequality 
between the individual and his reference group as a whole. 
Then we make a distinction between the individual’s SWB - inequality as perceived by 
individuals and social SWB - inequality, which is an average of the individual subjective 
well – being inequality perceptions. 
If we assume that social well being, as described by a social welfare function, depends on 
individual subjective well – being and on the individual’s perception of SWB – 
inequality, it follows that that the reference mechanism as such may have effect on the 
social welfare function. If a government accepts the task of increasing SWB, it may see 
influencing the social reference mechanism as a legitimate policy instrument. 
The present paper is a first and necessarily mainly theoretical exercise on this line. At the 
moment we do not know of available data to operationalize our model empirically. 
However, we outline how, as an extension of existing questionnaires , we may add new 
questions by means of which it becomes empirically possible to estimate the parameters 
of the referencing mechanism in practice. If such data are realized, the way lies open for 
an empirical operationalization of this model. 
We hope by this paper to have drawn more attention to the probably important role of the 
referencing mechanism for the implementation of social policy. 
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